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In a series of studies published during the past few years, World Bank economists
have provided detailed projections by simulating the possible outcomes of the Doha Round
negotiations.
1   The  projections  were  obtained  by  using  the  LINKAGE  Model,  which  is
considered to be a global dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  The
studies relied on the latest version of the LINKAGE Model, LINK6, which uses the Global
Trade Analysis Program (GTAP).  LINK6 incorporates 87 countries/regions and 57 sectors,
and uses a dataset that has been updated up to 2001.  This latter feature of the model,
according to the authors of the studies, has helped to generate far more realistic results
than those that used the earlier versions, which had incorporated data only up to 1997.
This chapter attempts a critical assessment of the above-mentioned studies.  Section
A presents an analysis of the results by looking at their implications for the developing
countries in general and India in particular.  Section B broadly alludes to some of the
methodological problems that are associated with CGE models of the LINKAGE genre.
The contention of the author is that the limitations of these models, especially in terms of
the assumptions on which they are based, deserve close scrutiny and that this dimension
needs to be kept in view as the results obtained from studies are read.
Section C comments on an important facet of this genre of studies, which is their
emphasis on unbridled trade liberalization involving agricultural products.  This facet ignores
the fact that the developing countries have been arguing that they need to address their
critical  concerns  regarding  food  security  and  livelihood  while  agreeing  to  the  eventual
Doha  Round  package.    Most  of  the  major  developing  countries  are  in  agreement  that
products  that  meet  their  food  security  needs,  and  which  support  sizeable  numbers  of
agricultural producers, should be granted higher levels of protection.  The so-called Special
Products  (SPs),  along  with  a  Special  Safeguard  Mechanism  (SSM),  are  the  essential
elements of the proposals tabled by these countries.
2  Section D presents a summary of
the points highlighted by this chapter.
1 The  most  quoted  of  these  papers  are  by  Kym Anderson,  Will  Martin  and  Dominique  van  der
Mensbrugghe (2005 and 2006).
2 The G33 group of developing countries took the lead in proposing that SPs and an SSM should
be included in the new agriculture deal.  Subsequently, the G20 group also lent its support to the G33
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A.  Analysis of the results
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy, first up
to 2005 and then up to 2015, assuming there are no other policy changes.  Deviations
from that baseline in 2015, due to total liberalization from 2005, are then examined.
3  The
simulations for 2015 are based on alternative scenarios of trade liberalization emerging
from the current round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The results have been presented
based on two sets of assumptions.  The first assumes full liberalization of global merchandise
trade.  The projections relying on this assumption are worked out on the basis of a new
source for protection data, which integrates trade preferences, specific tariffs and a partial
evaluation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
Inclusion of NTBs in the CGE models has been one of the less satisfactory aspects.
This stems from the fact that attempts made thus far to quantify the impact of NTBs has
not  been  fully  satisfactory.    While  the  database  on  non-tariff  measures  that  has  been
developed by UNCTAD, viz. the TRAINS database, is fraught with limitations ranging from
incomplete coverage
4 to problems related to the measurement of their differential impacts
on countries,
5 the Market Access Map (MAcMap) database that has been developed by
ITC together with CEPII (Paris) includes only tariff quotas in its database.  Considering
that  NTBs  (i.e.,  standards  and  others)  are  assuming  increasing  importance  in  a  world
where tariffs are steadily declining, this limitation of LINK6 needs to be highlighted.
The second set of results is based on some of the key proposals for agricultural
trade reforms that are being actively discussed in the ongoing negotiations.  The simulations
take into consideration the proposals for tariff cuts together with those for treating some of
the tariff lines as “sensitive” or “special products”.  What needs particular mention here is
that none of the results of the two sets takes cognizance of the subsidy dimension, which,
without  doubt,  holds  the  key  to  realizing  the  objective  of  a  distortion-free  market  for
agricultural commodities.
1.  Full liberalization of global merchandise trade
The first major set of results that is reported in the above-mentioned papers pertains
to the effect of the ongoing trade liberalization efforts on the real income up until 2015.
These estimates have been made against the benchmark that assumes a complete freeing
of merchandise trade during 2005-2010.  It has been reported that real income gains by
2015 for the global economy as a whole would be US$ 287.3 billion per year.  Of this
3 Anderson and others (2005).
4 For most countries, the TRAINS database covers NTBs until the end of the 1990s.  In the case of
India,  the  NTB  data  are  provided  up  to  1997,  which  is  even  before  the  removal  of  quantitative
restrictions (QRs) that India was maintaining for balance of payments purposes.
5 For instance, exporters from LDCs and developing countries endowed with a relatively low level of
technical skills would find it very difficult to conform to a technical barrier imposed by a developed
country.  However, the same may not be true for other countries.
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increase, the share of the developed countries would be US$ 201.6 billion while for the
developing countries the gains would be US$ 85.7 billion.  In other words, the share of the
developing countries in the total gains would be a third of the total global gains.  More
importantly, real income gains reported for the developing countries would be 0.8 per cent
of the baseline income in 2015, which is marginally higher than the corresponding figure
for the developed countries (0.6 per cent).  Among the developing countries, the relatively
prosperous Latin American region is expected to register real income of 1 per cent of the
baseline income in 2015 while for the South Asian region the corresponding figure is only
0.4 per cent.
These  broad  results  lend  themselves  to  two  varying  interpretations.    The  first,
which has been provided in the studies, is that the results are significantly favourable for
the developing countries since their expected real income gains are considerably larger
than their existing share in global production.  Thus, while the developing countries as
a whole account for a quarter of global production at present, they would be able to enjoy
a third of the global gains in real income that is expected annually until 2015.  An alternate
view is that what the results are pointing to is the increasing gulf between the relatively
prosperous and poorer countries.  In overall terms, it can be said that the disproportionately
large gains for the developed countries that the studies under discussion have predicted
would reinforce the status of the lesser players in the global economy as “developing”
even after the so-called “development round” has been implemented.  What is more, the
results point to increasing differentiation between the developing countries, as the more
prosperous regions are slated to record relatively larger increases in real income.
The disaggregated results provided for a small set of countries broadly reinforce
the above-mentioned conclusions.  India is expected to register a real income gain of only
US$ 3.4 billion a year, which is 0.4 per cent of the baseline income in 2015.  In the case of
China, the corresponding figures are US$ 5.6 billion and 0.2 per cent, respectively.  On the
other  hand,  countries  such  as Thailand  are  expected  to  gain  US$  7.7  billion  while  for
Argentina,  the  real  income  gain  could  be  nearly  US$  5  billion  (see  annex  table  1  for
details).
From the point of view of developing countries, the expected movements in the
terms of trade provide the most disquieting numbers for this set of results.  In what are
considered as pioneering studies, Raul Prebisch (1960) and Hans Singer (1950) pointed
out that developing countries, as exporters of primary commodities, faced deteriorating
terms of trade while trading with the exporters of manufactured goods, viz., the industrialized
countries.
6  Subsequently, many studies have argued that for most of the past six decades,
the terms of trade deterioration has been a major malaise for the developing countries.  In
fact, past studies had indicated that the developing countries would not have suffered the
ignominy of the debt crisis if they had not experienced deterioration in their terms of trade.
In their attempt to maintain their past levels of United States dollar earnings in the face of
6 For a more recent rendering of the issues involved, see United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (2005).166
the deteriorating terms of trade, developing countries have only encouraged the development
of  unsustainable  production  structures  that  could  have  serious  medium-  to  long-term
implications for their non-tradeables, particularly labour and the environment.
The results provided by the LINKAGE Model show that the developing countries as
a whole would suffer significant losses as a result of the changes in the terms of trade.
The total loss that those countries are expected to suffer is expected to be nearly US$ 30
billion per year.  This sharply contrasts with the projection for the high-income countries,
which  should  expect  more  than  US$  30  billion  gains  annually  from  the  terms  of  trade
changes alone.
Among the developing country groupings, the projected changes in the terms of
trade bring benefit only to the Latin American region.  The South Asian region would suffer
the largest losses on this account, amounting to more than US$ 11 billion per year, and
most of those losses would be because of the US$ 9.4 billion losses that India is projected
to suffer annually.
7  The results show that India and China would suffer the largest losses
arising from the movements in the terms of trade.  This implies that for the two emerging
economies the projected gains in real income would come at a considerable price in terms
of domestic resource use.
The gains from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, as estimated by the
LINKAGE Model, occur largely due to the liberalization of the agriculture and food sectors.
Almost two-thirds of the global gains are due to agricultural trade liberalization and are
expected mainly because high-income countries would liberalize their agriculture sector.
While  these  results  are  more  along  the  expected  lines,  the  disaggregated  results  that
capture the impact of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output as well
as trade, should raise plenty of heckles in many low-income developing countries, including
India.
According to the results provided by the LINKAGE Model, global trade liberalization
would significantly squeeze global agricultural output by 2015.  Agricultural output should
decrease by almost US$ 138 billion per year relative to the baseline.  The members of the
European Union would experience a sharp downturn in their output, as would also be the
case for Japan.  From among the group of developing countries, India and China are
expected to face declines in agricultural output; in the case of the former country, the
decline is expected to be much larger in absolute terms.  However, the group of agricultural
exporters (the Cairns group countries) are likely to have a vastly different experience.  Two
of the major countries in this group, i.e., Brazil and Argentina, are expected to find their
agricultural output increasing annually by US$ 66 billion and US$ 12 billion, respectively.
Some of the South-East Asian countries are also expected to register gains, albeit relatively
small amounts.  However, while Brazil and Argentina are projected to make a collective
gain of more than US$ 76 billion a year, the gains for the developing countries as a whole
7 The losses that India would suffer because of adverse terms of trade would be nearly three times
its real income gains following from the full liberalization of global merchandise trade.167
are put at US$ 67 billion.  Quite obviously, therefore, some countries in the developing
world are expected to suffer significant losses, and this group of countries is headed by
India.  The projected annual losses for India a projected to be of the order of US$ 24
billion per year, which is a 4 per cent decline in relation to the baseline.  Together with
India, China is also expected to be a loser, but of a much smaller magnitude (US$ 10
billion per year).
The projections made by LINK6 about the winners and losers in the agriculture
sector following from the global trade liberalization have yet another significant dimension,
in  that  the  distribution  of  gains  within  the  developing  world  is  expected  to  be  highly
skewed.  Thus, while the middle-income countries are expected to register annual increases
of more than US$ 88 billion a year, the low-income countries are expected to suffer annual
losses of more than US$ 21 billion.  These results have serious longer-term implications
since the projected losers in the developing world will be those countries that are significantly
dependent  on  the  agricultural  sector  as  a  source  of  livelihood  for  a  majority  of  their
populations.  What the World Bank is therefore trying to tell us is that the agricultural
sector  in  developing  countries  such  as  India,  which  is  already  feeling  a  tremendous
squeeze, could suffer further as full global trade liberalization takes effect.
In regard to trade in agricultural products, the projections provided by LINK6 have
a  few  surprises.    China  is  shown  to  be  emerging  as  a  major  exporter  of  agricultural
products, with a likely export growth of nearly 146 per cent over the baseline.  In comparison,
China’s  import  growth  is  expected  to  be  a  modest  27  per  cent.    India  is  expected  to
register a tremendous increase in agricultural imports – in excess of 165 per cent over the
baseline.  However, India’s exports of agricultural commodities would increase by a relatively
modest 53 per cent.  These figures do not bode well for a country that is expecting to
improve its presence in the global market for agricultural commodities once the prevailing
policy distortions are substantially eliminated at the end of the current round of negotiations.
An interesting facet of the results on the emerging scenario in agricultural trade is
that some of the agricultural exporters in the South-East Asian countries are not expected
to do as well.  For example, Thailand should expect a large import surge but only modest
gains in exports by 2015.
For most developing countries, the objectives of food security and protection of
livelihoods  remains  of  paramount  importance  in  the  current  round  of  multilateral  trade
negotiations.  Food security, as is commonly understood, is the access to food at all times
and at prices that are affordable.  Thus, individual countries can ensure realization of the
objective of food security by removing uncertainties in supplies and by having a reasonable
control over the prices of the commodities forming the food basket.  It may be argued that
these twin objectives can at once be realized primarily by promoting local production of
foodgrains.  Furthermore, encouragement of the local production systems in developing
countries would be the sine qua non for addressing the issue of livelihood security in the
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The question of whether or not developing countries would be able to address their
food security concerns by promoting their domestic production systems has been addressed
in the studies under discussion here.  However, these results suffer from at least two sets
of  limitations.    First,  the  results  have  been  presented  in  terms  of  the  broad  groups  of
countries, with the exception of China.  Second, the results for developing countries have
been captured via regional groups, but not all regional groups have been included in the
tables.
The results indicate that while the developing countries as a whole would be fully
self-sufficient
8 in respect of food and agricultural products following full global liberalization
of merchandise trade, the developed countries would increase their dependence on the
global markets for these products.  As for the regional groups of developing countries, the
Latin American countries would improve their position as net suppliers to the global market,
as would the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.  At the same time, however, the South Asian
countries would face deterioration in their self-sufficiency ratio and, in case of China, full
liberalization of global merchandise trade leaves the self-sufficiency ratio unaltered.
9  It
should be pointed out that the projected deterioration in the self-sufficiency ratio in food
and  agriculture  products  for  the  South Asian  region  is  a  result  of  the  large  imbalance
between the growth of imports and exports that has been estimated for India.  As indicated
above,  LINK6  has  estimated  a  large  increase  in  India’s  import  volumes  together  with
a relatively modest increase in exports in the aftermath of full trade liberalization.
The foregoing discussion shows quite clearly that the claims of a win-win situation
arising from the full liberalization of merchandise trade, which the World Bank has never
ceased to make, have been challenged by World Bank-supported studies.  The results
indicate that liberalization of merchandise trade would lead to greater inequities in the
global economy, much of which would be reflected in the realm of trade.  The inequities
would not just be between the developed and the developing countries, but even between
developing countries.  Thus, while the relatively advanced countries in the Latin American,
East  Asian  and  South-East  Asian  regions  are  expected  to  perform  much  better,  the
low-income countries, particularly those in the South Asian region, would be confirmed as
the  laggards.   The  studies  also  point  to  a  sharp  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade  of
a large majority of developing countries, which could take place in the aftermath of the
liberalization episode.  Changes in the terms of trade faced by the developing countries
and their implications have not been given much importance in the current discourse, but it
is the author’s view that countries suffering from the adverse terms of trade movements
need to remember the seminal contributions of Prebisch, Singer and other scholars to
making us understand the inimical consequences of this phenomenon.
8 Defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption.
9 The results predict a 91 per cent self-sufficiency ratio for China.  This conclusion needs to be seen
in the context of an earlier World Bank study that predicted China could attain a self-sufficiency ratio of
90 per cent in cereals, but only if it made substantial investments in bolstering agricultural productivity.
See World Bank (1997).169
What  is  particularly  significant  is  the  fact  that  the  liberalization  of  merchandise
trade is likely to have deleterious consequences for the agricultural sector of the South
Asian region.  In this context, results provided for India stand out.  The results indicate
a decline in India’s agricultural output; as a logical corollary, India is expected to end up
increasing its imports by a wide margin.  The results thus portend a major crisis that India,
and  some  of  the  other  low-income  countries,  would  face  should  full  liberalization  of
merchandise trade take place.
The second set of results provides simulations using various proposals in the realm
of  market  access  that  are  currently  being  discussed  as  a  part  of  the  Doha  Round  of
multilateral trade negotiations.  The following discussion brings out the key features of the
results.
2.  Doha Round scenarios
Based on the proposals that are on the negotiating table, eight scenarios have
been provided for working out the possible outcome the Doha Round:
(a) Scenario  1  –  Tariff  reduction  using  the  tiered  formula  with  three  rates  of
reduction for developed countries (45, 70 and 75 per cent), four for developing
countries (35, 40, 50 and 60 per cent) and no reduction for least developed
countries (LDCs).
(b) Scenario 2 – Inclusion of “sensitive” products in scenario 1 with developed
countries being allowed to treat 2 per cent of their HS six-digit tariff lines as
“sensitive”,  which  would  be  subjected  to  tariff  reduction  of  15  per  cent.
Developing countries and LDCs allowed 4 per cent of HS six-digit tariff lines
as “special” products.
(c) Scenario 3 – Inclusion of “sensitive” products in scenario 1 with developed
countries being allowed to treat 5 per cent of their HS six-digit tariff lines as
“sensitive”, which would be subject to tariff reduction of 15 per cent.  Developing
countries and LDCs allowed 10 per cent of HS six- digit tariff lines as “special”
products.
(d) Scenario 4 – A proportional cut in tariffs that brings about the same reduction
in average agricultural tariffs in developed countries as a group (44 per cent)
and developing countries as a group (21 per cent), as would be the case by
using the tiered formula.
(e) Scenario  5  –  Includes  in  scenario  4,  2  per  cent  “sensitive”  products  for
developed  countries  and  4  per  cent  “sensitive”  and  “special”  products  for
developing  countries.    As  a  result,  the  average  tariff  reduction  would  be
16 per cent for developed countries and 9 per cent for developing countries.
(f) Scenario  6  – Adds  to  scenario  5  a  tariff  cap  of  200  per  cent  –  resultant
average cuts in agricultural tariffs, 18 per cent170
(g) Scenario 7 – Includes in scenario 1 cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of
50 per cent to be effected by developed countries, 33 per cent by developing
countries and none by LDCs.
(h) Scenario 8 – Developing countries and LDCs take the same level of cuts in
bound tariffs on non-agricultural products as do the developed countries in
scenario 7.
The  results  obtained  under  each  of  these  scenarios  have  some  interesting
dimensions.    The  largest  gains  in  real  income  for  all  countries  and  country  groupings
would  be  made  only  when  the  parallelism  between  tariff  reductions  in  agricultural  and
non-agricultural products becomes a reality.
10  At the other extreme, are the results obtained
under scenario 3, which provides for the inclusion of “sensitive” and “special” in the mode.
The results show a decline in the real income for developing countries as a whole, with
only  gains  for  the  developed  countries.    Therefore,  the  studies  under  discussion  are
predicting that developing countries would be worse off by taking recourse to the special
and differential treatment.
The major results presented for the various Doha Round scenarios need to be
critically evaluated as they appear to be militating against the position that the developing
countries have taken during the negotiations.  Based on their assessment of the impact of
trade liberalization on their economies, developing countries have argued that gradualism
must be accepted as the universal basis for liberalization efforts that are under way in the
current Round.  This principle has been emphasized particularly in the area of agriculture,
where concerns for the small and marginal farmers and their lack of staying power in the
market, in the face of competition from agro-business, have been raised.  What has lent
strength to their arguments is the fact that in several developing countries, the “big bang”
liberalization episodes involving the agriculture sector have had inimical consequences for
production and employment in the sector.
11
It may be pointed out that the results presented in the studies do not capture the
objective  reality  because  of  the  inherent  limitations  of  the  methodology  of  the  model
employed.  In the past few years, critics have pointed to the methodological shortcomings
of the CGE framework upon which the LINKAGE Model is based.  As is briefly indicated in
the next section, the assumptions upon which the LINKAGE Model is based are either
unrealistic in nature or are far removed from the conditions that exist in the developing
world.    It  must  be  mentioned  that  the  limitations  alluded  to  here  are  intrinsic  to  the
10 The  implications  of  this  finding  should  be  considered  carefully  in  the  light  of  the  Hong  Kong
Ministerial  Declaration,  which,  in  paragraph  24,  instructed  the  “negotiators  to  ensure  that  there  is
a  comparably  high  level  of  ambition  in  market  access  for  agriculture  and  NAMA”.   Although  the
Declaration  added  that  “[t]his  ambition  is  to  be  achieved  in  a  balanced  and  proportionate  manner
consistent with the principle of special and differential treatment”, the findings of the studies in question
suggest that developing countries would be better off by foregoing their S&D options.
11 Dhar (2005) gives an account of the experiences of some of the South-East Asian countries in this
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LINKAGE Model; in other words, whatever “improved” versions of the present studies that
the authors may subsequently present to us, the results would still remain debatable.
B.  Methodological limitations of the LINKAGE Model
In a persuasive article, Ackerman (1999) has given us plenty to think about with
regard to the structural limitations of the CGE framework.  The general equilibrium theory
bases itself on the two Arrow-Debreu theorems developed in the 1950s.  The first postulates
that  assuming  the  existence  of  a  competitive  market  economy,  any  market  equilibrium
would be Pareto optimum.  The second theorem stipulates that under certain conditions,
every Pareto optimum is a market equilibrium given some initial conditions.  There has
been considerable debate centring on the Arrow-Debreu framework, the nub of which is
the  realism  of  some  of  the  assumptions.   Ackerman,  for  example,  points  out  that  the
assumptions such as increasing returns to scale are a common occurrence, but if this fact
is incorporated in the theory, the existence of equilibrium is no longer certain.  This would,
in other words, imply that a Pareto optimum need not be market equilibrium.
The major problem with the CGE models, as has been commented upon by several
of its critics, stems from the rather limited set of assumptions on which they are based.
These models are primarily market simulation models incorporating idealistic behaviour of
producers and consumers across markets and determining equilibrium, market-clearing
prices and quantities.  The limitation of considering the ideal types could lead to problems
of aggregation, as aggregate demand, for example, may not be as well-behaved as individual
demand.  Micro-foundations of macroeconomics can, therefore, be fraught with imponderables.
This general discussion sets the stage for looking at some of the specifications that
have been used to define the LINKAGE Model.  As indicated briefly, some of the assumptions
on which the model is based do not even remotely capture the reality, particularly in the
developing countries.  Some of the assumptions made in the model are that:
(a) “All sectors are assumed to operate under cost optimization”.  This assumption
assumes away market imperfections that may not allow producers to manage
their operations for ensuring “cost optimization”.
(b) “Three  different  production  archetypes  are  defined  in  the  model  –  crops,
livestock  and  all  other  goods  and  services.    Sectors  are  differentiated  by
different input combinations and substitution elasticities within each one of
the main production archetypes”.  Clearly, the problem of aggregation, as
was alluded to above, would occur because of this assumption.  This problem
would appear in a more acute manner in the case of a country such as India,
which has an extremely diversified agricultural sector.
(c) “The key feature of the crop production structure is the substitution between
intensive cropping versus extensive cropping, i.e., between fertilizer and land”.
This  assumption  assumes  away  the  production  rigidities  that  exist  in  the
agricultural  sector  of  the  developing  countries.    An  overwhelmingly  large172
proportion of the farm population has virtually no choice, in so far as changing
the nature of crop production.  Change in the relative prices of fertilizers and
land could not, therefore, lead to any change in the production structure.
(d) “Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors”.  Refer to
the comment made in respect of assumption (c).
(e) “Each national economy is divided into two distinct geographic zones [that]
define potentially separate labour markets.  A single elasticity … determines
the nature of the labour market”.  Labour markets are far from the ideal type
that is assumed for the purposes of the model in question.  In particular, the
assumption of “a single elasticity” does not at all capture the complexities of
the labour market as it exists in developing countries.
The  above-mentioned  examples  of  assumptions  made  in  the  LINKAGE  Model
unerringly point to the need for interpreting the results with some degree of caution.
It does appear that some of the leading advocates of the CGE models are quite
aware  of  the  limitations  when  they  suggest  that  the  results  of  the  models  should  be
undergo the test of validation with observations from the real world, which they have tried
to capture.  It has been argued that such cross-checking “has to allow for the fact that the
projections  from  an AGE  (applied  general  equilibrium)  are  conditional  in  that  they  are
based on particular assumptions about values of variables exogenous to the model, and,
as such, the projections could deviate from the actual outcomes if the realized values of
exogenous variables differed from the assumed values”.  It has been further surmised that
in  “actual  implementation,  aspects  of  policy  could  differ  from  their  assumed  values”.
12
Thus, while some of the foremost protagonists of the CGE models have suggested that
the results of the models should be considered after examining their validity with the real
world, the authors of the studies under discussion have presented their results in such
a manner that the decision makers should treat them as absolute benchmarks.  In this
context,  it  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  even  during  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,
a  plethora  of  studies,  again  using  the  CGE  models,  projected  significant  gains  for  the
developing countries that turned out to be no more than a chimera.
13  Several developing
countries had, in fact, made extensive commitments hoping for the gains that the studies
had projected; however, only two years after the implementation of the Uruguay Round
package had begun, they were forced to bring to the fore the fact that the anticipated
gains had not materialized.
14
Further corroboration was provided recently of the point that the recommendations
made  by  the  genre  of  studies  referred  to  above  are  unlikely  to  benefit  the  developing
countries.  A study by Maros Ivanic and Will Martin (2006) on “Potential implications of
12 Kehoe, Srinivasan and Whalley (2005).
13 See, for example, Goldin and Mensbrugghe (1993).
14 These issues were first raised by developing countries as the so-called “implementation issues” in
the Second Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in 1998.173
agricultural special products for poverty in low-income countries”
15 provided an expansive
analysis of how poverty in developing countries would increase if those countries relied on
the instrument of SPs, which, according to the G20 and the G33 countries, must form
a central pillar of the outcome of the Doha Round negotiations on agriculture.  However,
as  indicated  in  the  following  section,  the  exposition  of  Ivanic  and  Martin  is  based  on
a flawed understanding of the bases on which the G20 and G33 countries have argued
for the recognition of SPs.
C.  Inadequate understanding of the critical concerns
of developing countries
Although from the title of the paper it would appear that they are addressing the
problems of poverty at the economy-wide level, the authors are effectively focusing on
urban poverty for arriving at most of their conclusions.  Thus, the authors surmise that
poverty would increase because protection granted to the SPs would increase prices of
staples and would hence affect the marginalised sections of the urban population.  This
conclusion is based on an inappropriate methodology for selecting the SPs.  The authors
use only a few elements of the criteria proposed by the G33, which helps them to assume
that SPs would only comprise staples.  They fail to recognize that list of SPs would also
include non-food commodities that are significant from the point of view of safeguarding
livelihoods, besides contributing to rural development.  These two criteria are extremely
important, as they could provide the much needed policy space for the developing countries
to improve the fortunes of their rural economy.
In putting forth their strong arguments against the use of SPs, the authors seem to
be unaware that one of the major causes of growing urban poverty in most developing
countries is the fact that the rural sector in those countries has faced relative neglect; in
other words, there has been a bias against this sector in the overall development priorities.
With  the  rural  sector  failing  to  create  increased  employment  opportunities  due  to  this
policy  bias,  the  urban  centres  appear  to  have  provided  the  much  needed  window  of
opportunities for the rural population.  However, the resultant large-scale migration has
eventually swelled the ranks of the marginalized sections in the urban areas.  For the
developing  countries,  therefore,  development  of  the  rural  economy  –  which  includes
above all the improvement in the income-generating capacities of agriculture – is of utmost
priority.  Many of these countries have argued in the ongoing negotiations on agriculture
that the “development dimension” must be recognized by granting the much needed policy
space for the developing countries to pursue the right set of policies, one that removes the
policy bias against the agricultural sector.  The key to the pursuit of this objective, in the
view of the G20 and the G33, is the mechanism of SPs.
15 The  comments  are  based  on  a  version  of  the  paper  dated  16  October  2006.    Subsequently,
however, the World Bank withdrew the paper in the face of critical comments.  On 24 January 2007,
Francois J. Bourguignon, World Bank Chief Economist, issued a statement saying that the final paper
would be posted on the World Bank’s research page “when the research is complete and it has gone
through the standard review processes”.174
The inadequate understanding of the authors is also reflected in their comments
that increased protection from the use of SPs “effect poverty through three broad channels”.
The  first  is  the  “effect  of  commodity  prices  and  wages  on  incomes  in  the  short  term”.
While the authors are concerned about the detrimental effect of commodity price rise on
the urban consumers, most developing counties would like to use the SPs to influence
commodity prices and wages so as to benefit the farm households.  It may be argued that
the  main  reason  for  using  the  instrument  of  SPs  is  to  ensure  reversal  of  the  secular
decline in commodity prices, in particular prices of commodities that are critical for providing
livelihood security for farm households.  In the past decades, low commodity prices have
reduced the farmers in developing countries to marginalized existence and this situation
can  get  far  worse  if  the  subsidized  commodities  are  allowed  to  enter  the  developing
country markets for “promoting” trade.
According to Ivanic and Martin (2006), the second adverse effect of protecting SPs
would be that resources would be “diverted away from the activities that yield the highest
social returns into those that generate the highest market returns at distorted prices”.  It is
argued here that the purpose of the SPs is precisely to divert resources into the agriculture,
since  this  would  yield  the  highest  social  return  in  the  medium  to  the  long  term.   As
indicated earlier, the policy bias against agriculture had militated against the flow of resources
into the sector that supports around two-thirds of the workforce in India.  This policy bias
can be set right by providing adequate protection to the products that are sensitive in
nature by using the mechanism of SPs.  There is absolutely no case for lowering protection
to products that are identified as SPs by promoting inefficient producers who can take
advantage of the distorted prices in the markets for agricultural commodities.
The third concern of the authors that SPs would result in diverting resources away
from “export-oriented activities towards import replacement”, causing productivity to fall,
again  exposes  their  limited  understanding  of  economic  realities.    Contrary  to  their
understanding  that  the  SPs  are  to  be  viewed  from  the  trade  perspective,  developing
countries have argued that this instrument would ensure the realization of food security
and protection of livelihoods, which stand out among the major objectives of development
policy.    These  countries  have  frequently  argued  that  that  the  twin  objectives  of  food
security and livelihoods protection should be viewed as non-trade concerns.
The issue of food security has been identified as a major objective to be pursued
by the global community by the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World
Food Summit Plan of Action in 1996.  The Summit emphasized that food security exists
when “all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life”.  The Rome Declaration took into consideration the multifaceted character of food
security, and emphasized that “concerted national action and effective international efforts”
were needed to “supplement and reinforce national action.”
16   The Plan of Action adopted
16 Food  and Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  Report  of  the  World  Food  Summit,
13-17 November 1996 (WFS 96/REP), part one, appendix.175
by the World Food Summit proposed that “each nation must adopt a strategy consistent
with its resources and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the same time,
cooperate regionally and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to global
issues  of  food  security.”  Besides  emphasizing  the  importance  of  national  policies,  the
Rome Declaration and the Plan of Action presented an interesting perspective on the role
of trade in the pursuit of food security.  The participating countries expressed their commitment
to “strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall trade policies are conducive to
fostering  food  security  for  all  through  a  fair  and  market-oriented  world  trade  system.”
Thus, quite contrary to the view that imperatives of trade should be given primacy, as is
the underlying theme of the Ivanic and Martin paper, the World Food Summit had emphasized
that food security should be the primary concern of the global community.
D.  Conclusions
This chapter provides a critical view of the studies based on the LINKAGE Model,
a variant of the CGE models, which have projected the possible outcomes of the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  These studies have provided detailed estimates
of  the  likely  gains/losses  for  individual  countries/groups  of  countries  in  2015,  and  the
projected end-date for the implementation of the commitments that WTO member States
would take at the end of the current round of negotiations.
The aggregative results presented in the studies indicate that of the annual gains
in real income that would result from full liberalization of merchandise trade in all WTO
member States, the share of the developing countries would be one-third.  According to
the authors of the studies in question, developing countries should consider the projected
gains as a favourable outcome, since their current share in global production is around
25 per cent of the total.  However, what these results also imply is that the wedge between
the developed and the developing countries would get wider following a disproportionately
large increase in the gains for the former.
The detailed results for individual countries/groups of countries only provide more
evidence  of  a  widening  gap  between  the  more  prosperous  and  the  less  prosperous
regions of the world.  In the developing world, the likely gainers are the more advanced
middle-income countries, while the low-income countries, including India, would not fare
well.  The more disturbing of the results is the projected deterioration of the terms of trade,
particularly in countries such as India and China, in the aftermath of full liberalization of
global merchandise trade.  This chapter has attempted to argue that it is these detailed
results, rather than the aggregative numbers, that need to looked at carefully.
An  attempt  has  also  been  made  to  indicate  that  there  is  a  more  fundamental
problem with these studies.  The CGE models are based on assumptions whose veracity
is questionable, particularly in the case of developing countries.  In addition, as expected,
the models are considerably at odds with the reality in the developing countries.176
It is pertinent to note here that some of the leading advocates for the CGE models
have opined that the results obtained from the models must be cross-checked with real-life
conditions in order to ascertain their reliability.  Such an exercise is, of course, impossible
in respect of the results that the studies in question have provided.  However, what should
be pointed out is that CGE models of an earlier generation projected substantial gains for
the  developing  countries  following  on  from  the  implementation  of  the  Uruguay  Round
package.  It would have been more appropriate if the authors of the papers under discussion
had presented their results against the backdrop of the past frailties of their models.177
References
Ackerman, F., 1999.  “Still dead after all these years:  Interpreting the failure of General
Equilibrium Theory”, Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper
No. 00-01, Tufts University (available at:  http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae).
Anderson,  K.,  W.  Martin  and  D.  van  der  Mensbrugghe,  2006.    “Market  and  Welfare
Implications  of  Doha  Reform  Scenarios”,  in  K. Anderson  and  W.  Martin  (eds.),
Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, London, Palgrave
Macmillan, and Washington, D.C., World Bank (available at:  http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1109114763805/Ch12_
AndersonMartin Mensbrugghe.pdf).
,  2005.    “Distortions  to  world  trade:    Impacts  on  agricultural  markets  and  farm
incomes”, CIES Discussion Paper 0519, University of Adelaide.
Dhar, B., 2005.  “Liberalization in agricultural trade:  Issues and concerns”, paper presented
at  the  joint  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for Asia  and  the
Pacific and International Trade Centre Seminar on “Delivering on the WTO Round:
a High-level Government-Business Dialogue for Development”, 4-6 October 2005;
reprinted in Studies in Trade and Investment, No. 56, ESCAP.
Goldin, I. and D. van der Mensbrugghe, 1993.  Trade Liberalisation:  What’s At Stake?
Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Policy Brief No. 5.
Ivanic, M. and W. Martin, 2006.  “Potential implications of agricultural Special Products for
poverty in low-income countries”, World Bank (mimeograph).  (See footnote 15.)
Kehoe,  T.,  T.N.  Srinivasan  and  J.  Whalley  (eds.),  2005.    Frontiers  in Applied  General
Equilibrium Modelling:  In honour of Herbert Scarf, Cambridge University Press.
Prebisch, R., 1960.  “The economic development of Latin America and its principal problem”,
New York.
Singer,  Hans  W.,  1950.    “The  distribution  of  gains  between  investing  and  borrowing
countries”, American Economic Review, vol. XL (May), pp. 473-485.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2005.  “Trade and Development
Report”, Geneva.
van  der  Mensbrugghe,  D.,  2004.    “LINKAGE  technical  reference  document:    Version
6.0”,  (mimeograph),  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.  (available  at:    http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1100792545130/
LinkageTechNote.pdf).
World Bank, 1997.  “At China’s table:  Food security options”, Washington, D.C.178
Annex
Annex table 1.  Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global
merchandise trade, by country/region, 2015
(Relative to the baseline, in 2001 US$)
Real income
Gain due just As percentage
Country/region gain
to change in of baseline
(US$ billion)
terms of trade  income in
(US$ billion)  2015
Australia and New Zealand 6.1 3.5 1.0
EU25 and EFTA 65.2 0.5 0.6
United States of America 16.2 10.7 0.1
Canada 3.8 -0.3 0.4
Japan 54.6 7.5 1.1
Republic of Korea and 44.6 0.4 3.5
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 11.2 7.9 2.6
Argentina 4.9 1.2 1.2
Bangladesh 0.1 -1.1 0.2
Brazil9.9 4.6 1.5
China 5.6 -8.3 0.2
India 3.4 -9.4 0.4
Indonesia 1.9 0.2 0.7
Thailand 7.7 0.7 3.8
Viet Nam 3.0 -0.2 5.2
Russian Federation 2.7 -2.7 0.6
Mexico 3.6 -3.6 0.4
South Africa 1.3 0.0 0.9
Turkey 3.3 0.2 1.3
Rest of South Asia 1.0 -0.8 0.5
Rest of East Asia 5.3 -0.9 1.9
Rest of Latin America and 10.3 0.0 1.2
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA 1.0 -1.6 0.3
Middle East and North Africa 14.0 -6.4 1.2
Selected sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 0.5 1.5
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 -2.3 1.1
Rest of world 3.4 0.1 1.5
High-income countries 201.6 30.3 0.6
Developing countries – 141.5 -21.4 1.2
   WTO definition
Developing countries 85.7 -29.7 0.8179
   Middle-income countries 69.5 -16.7 0.8
   Low-income countries 16.2 -12.9 0.8
East Asia and the Pacific 23.5 -8.5 0.7
South Asia 4.5 -11.2 0.4
Europe and Central Asia 7.0 -4.0 0.7
Middle East and North Africa 14.0 -6.4 1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 -1.8 1.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 28.7 2.2 1.0
World total 287.3 0.6 0.7
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
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Annex table 2.  Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of
global merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015
(Relative to baseline scenario)*








Developing countries         
Agriculture, food 28 19 47 33 9 17
Textiles, clothing 9 14 23 10 7 8
Other merchandise 6 52 58 7 26 20
All sectors 43 85 128 50 42 45
High-income countries       
Agriculture, food 26 109 135 30 54 47
Textiles, clothing 13 2 15 15 1 5
Other merchandise 4 5 9 5 2 3
All sectors 43 116 159 50 57 55
All countries liberalize       
Agriculture, food 54 128 182 63 64 63
Textiles, clothing 22 16 38 25 8 14
Other merchandise 10 57 67 12 28 23
All sectors 86 201 287 100 100 100
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
* Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum
to 100 per cent.180
Annex table 3.  Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and
food output and trade, by country/region, 2015




Country/region relative to baseline
  Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output
Australia and New Zealand 18.0 1.4 27.9 38.0 23.0 20.5
EU25 and EFTA 21.7 103.5 -185.8 -10.8 39.3 -12.3
United States 18.4 16.5 30.7 11.6 25.6 0.0
Canada 14.6 6.9 7.2 40.2 54.3 4.8
Japan 2.8 34.7 -91.7 60.4 169.7 -18.4
Republic of Korea and 33.2 12.3 -0.4 600.2 189.8 20.2
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 7.0 1.5 7.4 115.2 7.6 35.4
Argentina 10.4 0.7 12.2 44.2 36.9 11.5
Bangladesh 0.8 0.4 -2.5 60.9 15.6 0.8
Brazil38.0 2.8 66.4 120.6 48.4 34.0
China 15.1 24.1 -9.9 145.6 27.3 -0.9
India 5.1 13.4 -23.8 53.2 165.4 -3.7
Indonesia 3.6 1.9 4.5 32.2 23.5 2.4
Thailand 5.6 5.2 5.3 29.2 57.2 4.7
Viet Nam 1.2 3.3 -2.1 13.9 170.4 -13.3
Russian Federation 0.7 4.4 -7.8 15.4 22.3 -5.4
Mexico 11.9 6.7 6.2 66.0 52.9 2.2
South Africa 2.4 1.1 1.4 55.9 40.2 4.9
Turkey 4.3 4.3 -0.1 109.4 140.3 0.5
Rest of South Asia 2.9 3.7 -1.5 57.1 83.3 -1.8
Rest of East Asia and the Pacific 9.4 5.8 7.4 61.7 50.7 6.8
Rest of Latin America and 36.0 9.6 37.0 68.1 42.3 11.7
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA 9.2 10.9 -22.2 106 90.5 -1.6
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 17.5 -7.8 64.1 43.1 -1.2
Selected sub-Saharan African 4.5 1.3 5.3 50.0 74.4 9.2
   countries
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 9.5 8.1 -4.1 45.4 79.2 -0.6
Rest of world 8.2 5.8 2.9 168.3 123.3 4.4
High-income countries 115.8 176.7 -204.7 15.7 65.5 -5.3
Developing countries 191.9 131 66.8 67.4 51.5 2.2181
   Middle-income countries 156.1 93.1 88.2 72.7 41.9 3.2
   Low-income countries 35.8 37.9 -21.4 52.3 99.3 -1.0
East Asia and the Pacific 34.8 40.4 5.2 54.4 35.5 0.1
South Asia 8.9 17.5 -27.8 55.1 122.9 -3.0
Europe and Central Asia 14.2 19.6 -30.0 79.7 62.6 -1.9
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 17.5 -7.8 64.1 43.1 -1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.4 10.5 2.6 47.7 71.6 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 96.3 19.8 121.8 75.7 46.1 13.8
World total (excluding 307.7 307.7 -137.8 36.3 59.8 -1.3
intra-European Union trade)
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
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Country/region relative to baseline
  Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output182




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anderson and others (2006).
* Self-suf
ficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption.184
Annex table 5.  Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015
(In 2001 US$ billion compared with baseline scenario)
 
Country/region
Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen.
1234  5678
Australia and New Zealand 2.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.8
EU25 and EFTA 29.5 10.7 9.1 28.2 10.7 10.9 31.4 35.7
United States 3.0 2.3 2 3.4 2.5 2.1 4.9 6.6
Canada 1.4 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.0
Japan 18.9 1.8 1.3 15.1 1.4 12.9 23.7 25.4
Republic of Korea and 10.9 1.7 1.6 7.3 1.7 15.9 15 22.6
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 2.2
Argentina 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.6
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Brazil3.3 1.1 0.9 3.2 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9
China -0.5 -1.5 -1.6 -0.4 -1.4 -1.1 1.7 1.6
India 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5
Indonesia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2
Thailand 0.9 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.7
Viet Nam -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6
Russian Federation -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.8 1.5
Mexico -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2
South Africa 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7
Turkey 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.4
Rest of South Asia 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7
Rest of East Asia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.6
Rest of Latin America and 3.7 0.5 0.5 3.7 0.5 0.4 3.9 4.0
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.1
Selected sub-Sahara African 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
   Countries
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3
Rest of world 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6
High-income countries 65.6 18.1 15.2 57.2 17.8 43.2 79.9 96.4
Developing countries 9.0 -0.4 -1.7 9.1 0.1 1.1 16.1 22.9
   Middle-income countries 8.0 -0.5 -1.9 8.3 0.0 1.0 12.5 17.1
   Low-income countries 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 3.6 5.9
East Asia and the Pacific 0.5 -0.8 -1.2 0.9 -0.4 0.6 4.5 5.5
South Asia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2
Europe and Central Asia 0.1 -0.9 -1.1 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.8 2.1
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.1 2.3 2.0 8.0 2.5 2.1 7.9 9.2
World total 74.5 17.7 13.4 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1 119.3
Source: Anderson and others (2006).185
Annex table 6.  Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios,
2015 percentage change
(In 2001 US$ billion compared with baseline scenario)
Country/region
Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen.
1234  5678
Australia and New Zealand 0.35 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.20 0.42 0.48
EU25 and EFTA 0.29 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.36
United States 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05
Canada 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11
Japan 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.48 0.51
Republic of Korea and 0.86 0.13 0.13 0.58 0.14 1.26 1.19 1.79
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.35 0.52
Argentina 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.39
Bangladesh -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09
Brazil0.50 0.16 0.13 0.49 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.59
China -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.06
India 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40
Indonesia 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.37 0.44
Thailand 0.43 0.29 0.15 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.99 1.33
Viet Nam -0.20 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97
Russian Federation -0.06 -0.16 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 0.16 0.31
Mexico -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02
South Africa 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.49
Rest of South Asia 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.39
Rest of East Asia 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.36 0.09 0.22
Rest of Latin America and 0.44 0.06 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.04 0.46 0.47
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.22 -0.26
Middle East and North Africa -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.01
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02 0.13
Rest of world 0.19 0.0 0.0 0.14 0.0 0.02 0.26 0.28
High-income countries 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.30
Developing countries 0.09 0.0 -0.02 0.09 0.0 0.01 0.16 0.22
   Middle-income countries 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.0 0.01 0.15 0.21
   Low-income countries 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.0 0.18 0.30
East Asia and the Pacific 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.16
South Asia 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36
Europe and Central Asia 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.21
Middle East and North Africa -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.1 -0.05 0.01
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.27
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.29 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.33
World total 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28
Source: Anderson and others (2006).186
Annex table 7.  Share of agricultural and food production exported






Baseline liberalization, Scenario 7
2015
Australia and New Zealand 33.3 37.2 42.7 39.5
EU25 and EFTA 16.7 17.3 17.6 16.6
EU25 and EFTA (excluding intra-EU25) 4.0 5.1 7.7 5.0
United States 6.3 7.9 9.2 8.1
Canada 24.5 29.5 40.0 32.5
Japan 0.9 1.2 2.3 1.5
Republic of Korea and 4.4 4.8 26.5 8.6
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 26.0 30.0 47.8 30.8
Argentina 21.6 25.2 32.5 26.9
Bangladesh 1.7 3.6 5.7 3.5
Brazil15.3 17.3 28.9 21.7
China 3.3 0.9 2.2 1.0
India 3.5 3.0 4.7 3.3
Indonesia 11.9 10.0 12.9 9.9
Thailand 30.2 28.2 34.6 30.1
Viet Nam 23.9 26.9 35.3 26.7
Russian Federation 6.1 5.5 6.7 6.0
Mexico 5.6 7.8 13.2 8.5
South Africa 16.0 12.7 18.8 13.5
Turkey 9.6 6.0 12.4 7.0
Rest of South Asia 6.0 6.2 9.9 6.6
Rest of East Asia 16.1 14.6 22.1 14.9
Rest of Latin America and Caribbean 13.9 18.1 27.1 20.7
Rest of ECA 2.4 1.7 3.7 1.9
Middle East and North Africa 5.2 6.7 11.2 7.2
Selected SSA countries 13.2 18.1 25.4 19.2
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 11.2 15.8 23.3 16.5
Rest of world 6.6 7.0 17.7 8.7
High-income countries 5.8 7.5 11.6 8.2
Developing countries 7.5 6.9 11.6 7.8
   Middle-income countries 7.6 6.6 11.4 7.6
   Low-income countries 7.3 7.9 12.4 8.4
East Asia and the Pacific 7.2 4.1 6.5 4.3
South Asia 3.8 3.6 5.7 3.9
Europe and Central Asia 3.7 2.7 5.0 3.0
Middle East and North Africa 5.2 6.7 11.2 7.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.5 15.8 23.1 16.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 12.7 15.9 24.8 18.5
World total 9.5 9.5 13.2 10.0
World total (excluding intra-EU25) 6.6 7.2 11.6 8.0
Source: Anderson and others (2006).